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NOTES AND COMMENTS
tion of the civil rights of religious minorities,15 picketers,16 and speak-
ers,1 T and to reflect the mores of fair-play and justice of an American
society in cases of capital crimes,28 the Blue case stands as an incon-
gruous result-a holding that reflects the unchecked bias and blind
patriotic passion against one who exercised an unpopular right to
strike in a time of grave national emergency.
FEDERAL JURISDICTION
LIMITATIONS ON FEDERAL EQUITY JURISDICTION
Appellants sought to enjoin enforcement of the 1944 "anti-closed
shop" amendment' to the Florida Constitution, alleging that it violated
the First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and the contract clause'
of the United States Constitution and that it conflicted with the Na-
tional Labor Relations Acts and the Norris-LaGuardia Act.' The
district court granted a temporary restraining order and caused a
three-judge court to be convened. This court, deciding the case on
the merits, vacated the restraining order and dismissed the com-
plaint.5 On appeal to the Supreme Court, reversed and remanded with
directions to retain the bill pending determination of proceedings in
the state courts which would supply the lacking construction and
interpretation of the amendment. American Federation of Labor v.
Watson, 66 Sup. Ct. 761 (1946).
After holding that the district court had jurisdiction to hear
and decide the case on the merits, that it was a proper case for a
three-judge district court, that the complaint stated a good cause of
action in equity on the grounds of threatened irreparable injury, the
Court concluded, Justice Douglas writing for the majority, 6 that it
was improper for the lower court to have ruled on the merits at this
stage of the litigation. The Court's action followed very closely its
15. E.g., the overruling of the Gobitis decision in West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Taylor v.
Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583 (1943).
16. E.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Carlson v. Cali-
fornia, 310 U.S. 106 (1940).
17. E.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
18. E.g., Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271 (1945); Asheraft v. Ten-
nessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227
(1940); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
1. Fla. Const., Declaration of Rights § 12; Fla. Laws, 1943, p. 1134,
ratified at the general election Nov. 7, 1944.
2. U. S. Const. Art I, § 10.
3. 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C.A. H§ 151 et seq. (1942).
4. 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 101 et seq. (1942).
5. American Federation of Labor v. Watson, 60 F. Supp. 1010 (S.D.
Fla. 1945).
6. Stone, C. J., dissented on the grounds that the bill should have
been dismissed for want of equity. Murphy, J., dissented on the
grounds that the Court should hear the appeal on the merits.
Jackson, J., took no part in the consideration of the case.
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decision in Specter Motor Co., Inc. v. McLaughlin.7 But the unpre-
dictable question of when a federal court sitting in equity should exer-
cise its discretion to refuse to decide a case although it has jurisdiction
still remains in considerable doubt.
It is a fundamental maxim that bills in equity are addressed to
the sound discretion of the court.8 A court of equity in the exercise
of this discretion may refuse to hear a case although it has jurisdic-
tion. In recent years this phase of equitable discretion has been
prominent in attempting a solution to the problem of interference by
federal courts in matters involving the application, interpretation,
and enforcement of state laws, especially uncertain or unsettled state
laws.
The issue is made more difficult by the holdings that both the
refusal to decide a case and the' interference by federal courts in the
application, interpretation, and enforcement of state laws can be war-
ranted only by "extraordinary circumstances". The usual "extraordin-
ary circumstances" which justify federal interference have been irre-
parable injury and a violation of a constitutionally protected right.9
The usual "extraordinary circumstances" which warrant refusal to
decide have involved a desire to uphold "the rightful independence of
state governments" or to further a recognized public policylo
There are several presently recognized situations affording exam-
ples of these extraordinary circumstances wherein the Supreme Court
has held that federal courts should not use their power to interfere:
1. with state criminal prosecutions except where moved by urgent
considerations;"'
2. with collection of state taxes or with the fiscal affairs of a
state ;12
3. with the state administrative function of prescribing local
utility rates; 3
4. with liquidation of state banks by a state officer where there
is no contention that shareholders and creditors will not be
protected ;14
5. in shaping the domestic policy of a state governing its admin-
istrative agencies.' 5
6. In addition, a federal court may stay proceedings before it,
to enable parties first to litigate in state courts questions of
7. 323 U.S. 101 (1944).
8. Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 235 (1943);
Beal v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 312 U.S. 45, 50 (1941).
9. Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387 (1941); Spielman Motor Co. v.
Dodge, 295 U.S. 89 (1935).
10. Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 235 (1943).
11. Beal v. Missouri Pac. R., 312 U.S. 45 (1941).
12. Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521 (1932). But cf. Hillsborough
Township v. Cromwell, 66 Sup. Ct. 445 (1946).
13. Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm. of Ky.,
290 U.S. 264 (1933).
14. Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U.S. 176 (1935).
15. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943); Railroad Comm.
v. Rowan & N. Oil Co., 311 U.S. 570 (1941).
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state law which are preliminary to and may rended unnecessary
a decision of constitutional questions.16
The basic principle underlying the above named situations appears
to be very similar to the underlying doctrine of Erie RJ?. v. Tompkinsl
-that the interpretation and application of purely local laws should
be left to the state courts and federal courts should exercise their
powers by interference only when exceptional circumstances arise.1s
In 1943, the Court added some confusion to the problem by its
decision in Burford v. Sun Oil Co.' 9 In this case, the only reason given
for refusing to enjoin enforcement of an order of the Texas Railroad
Commission was that a comprehensive system for review of the orders
of that body had been provided by statute in the state courts. Consid-
ering the intricacy of the orders of the commission and the economic
importance of the oil industry in Texas, it was deemed more wise for
the federal court not to interfere in the system of regulation. The
decision seems to rest as much on a basis of convenience in a situa-
tion involving substantial economic import in the particular state as
on the simple basis of non-interference in shaping the domestic policy
of a state.
The question is even less clear when the state law is merely un-
certain or in confusion as it is in the instant case where a new piece
of state legislation has received no construction by the state courts.
In 1940, the Supreme Court in Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.20
reversed a federal bankruptcy court because it had decided an un-
settled question of state property law.21 However, in 1943, in Mere-
dith v. City of Winter Haven,22 the Supreme Court reversed a circuit
court of appeals because it had not decided a question of applicability
and effect of a state statute for the reason that the state decisions
were so in conflict that it was doubtful just what the state law was.
In the Meredith case, the Court indulged in the presumption that the
last decision of the state supreme court represents the state law unless
it can be said with some certainty that the state court would not fol-
low it.23 Nevertheless, it appears that the Court swung back to the
classical view that it is the duty of the federal courts to decide a case
when it has jurisdiction unless there is some recognized public policy
or defined principle guiding the exercise of jurisdiction conferred
which would in exceptional cases warrant it non-exercise.24
16. Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, Inc., 316 U.S. 168 (1942).; Rail-
road Comm. of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941); Gil-
christ v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 279 U.S. 159 (1929);
Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240 (1926).
17. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
18. Di Giovani v. Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n, 296 U.S. 64 (1935); eases
cited n. 16 supra.
19. 319 U.S. 315 (1943); Note (1944) 53 Yale L. J. 788, 791.
20. 309 U.S. 478 (1940).
21. Ibid. The Court directed that the trustee in bankruptcy proceed
in state courts to determine the unsettled state law. Note (1940)
U. of Chi. L. Rev. 727.
22. 320 U.S. 228 (1943).




It has been declared that inasmuch as the Constitution gives fed-
eral courts jurisdiction in diversity cases, and that this has been
supplemented by legislation, it is the duty of the federal courts to
decide every diversity case coming before them, with the exception
of very unusual cases; that if a change of policy in accepting and
deciding diversity cases is to be made, Congress should make the
change. 25 Although this argument has great weight, neither can it
be denied that throughout our history, the Court has played an im-
portant part in shaping the legal, social, and political policy of our
country. It does not seem that the Court should fail to effectuate a
desirable policy solely on the grounds that it would be better for the
legislature to make the change.
The limitations heretofore placed by Congress on the jurisdiction
of federal courts have not been too broad nor in most cases proved
very effective. The question did not draw too much attention until
1908 when in Ex parte YouZng, 26 it was decided that a federal court
could enjoin a state official in the enforcement or threatened enforce-
ment of an alleged unconstitutional state statute notwithstanding the
Eleventh Amendment. In 1910, Congress enacted section 266 of the
Judicial Code 27 which provided that interlocutory injunctions of this
type could only be issued by a three-judge court with a right of direct
appeal to the Supreme Court. In subsequent years this section was
broadened slightly.28
In more recent years Congress has passed the Johnson Act 29
which withdrew jurisdiction to enjoin most state utility orders on
grounds of unconstitutionality but which has been largely ineffective. so
In 1937 a similar statute was passed regarding state taxes.31 In addi-
tion, there are the well-known limitations on injunctions in the labor
field.3
2
It is impossible to say at this time whether the conflicting views
shown in the Magnolia and Meredith cases rendered within four years
of each other evidence a genuine change of attitude of the Court, or
25. See dissent by Frankfurter, J., in Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S.
336, 348 (1943). But cf. Di Giovani v. Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n,
296 U.S. 64, 73 (1935) "Its discretion may be properly influenced
by considerations of public policy."; Matthews v. Rodgers, 284
U.S. 521, 525 (1932) "The scrupulous regard for the rightful
independence of state governments which should at all times
actuate the federal courts, and a proper reluctance to interfere
by injunction with their fiscal operation require that such relief
should be denied in every case where the asserted federal rigght
may be preserved without it." See also Note (1941) 54 Harv.
L. Rev. 1379, 1390.
26. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
27. 36 Stat. 557 (1910), 28 U.S.C.A. § 380 (1928).
28. 37 Stat. 1013 (1913), 28 U.S.C.A. § 380 (1928).
29. 48 Stat. 775 (1934), 28 U.S.C.A. § 41 (1) (Supp. 1945).
30. E.g., Mountain States Power Co. v. Public Service Comm., 299
U.S. 167 (1936); Corporation Comm. of Okla. v. Cary, 296
U.S. 452 (1935).
31. 50 Stat. 738 (1937), 28 U.S.C.A. § 41 (1) (Supp. 1945).
32. 47 Stat. 738 (1937), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 101 et seq. (1942).
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whether we are still in the formative state in a matter of serious
policy wherein no definite trend has begun to appear. We can say
that the manner in which the Court will treat the next case present-
ing the same problem is quite unpredictable. Like many questions of
law wherein an active social or political policy is the final arbiter,
the presence or absence of a few facts on either side may be the
deciding factor with little or no real attention given to preceding cases.
It is not contended that federal judges are less qualified than state
judges to decide questions of interpretation and application of state
law. However, it cannot be denied that most of these cases, especially
those where a constitutional question is involved, can travel to the
Supreme Court through the state courts as well as through the fed-
eral courts and in doing so will pick up the applicable interpretation
of state law which cannot be doubted to be the state law at least
for that case. This alone appears to be sufficient reason for litigants
to resort to state courts when an uncertain or unsettled question of
state law is inherent in the case, even though federal courts are
equally open to them so far as jurisdiction is concerned.
Although at present it is presumptuous to say that it is the policy
of the Court that state matters would be better litigated in state courts,
the instant case presents an almost too clear example of when a federal
court should refuse to rule on the merits of a case because the matter
would not only be better litigated in the state courts, but because it
is essential to have it litigated there. The Meredith case would seem
to indicate that the Court had withdrawn from its post-Erie attitude
of emphasizing federal noninterference with state laws.
The most effective way at present of avoiding this unnecessary
litigation and burden to both federal and state courts seems to be
with the clients and their lawyers, who, having a choice of either
federal or state courts, should choose the state courts when their liti-
gation involves a doubtful or uncertain application of state law.
JURISDICTION
FUTURE EARNINGS AS BASIS FOR EQUITY JURISDICTION
To compel the support and maintenance of minor children of parties
to a divorce, an equity court ordered sequestration of future salary of
the nonresident husband, who had been served by publication. The
salary was payable by his resident employer, a party to the action.
Later the court ordered that either the husband pay the award decreed
within a specified time or that the amount accumulated by the em-
ployer be paid to the plaintiff. Held: affirmed. The decree for main-
tenance was in rem since (a) a man's labor or right to labor is the
highest form of property,1 (b) the husband's property in his work
was in existence at the time of the sequestration order by analogy to
1. Massie v. Cessna, 239 Ill. 352, 358, 70 N.E. 564, 565 (1904) (freedom
to contract for assignment of wages); Frorer v. People, 141 Ill.
171, 181, 31 N.E. 395, 396 (1892) (freedom to contract for manner
of payment of wages).
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